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ABSTRACT 
The Australian coral reef fin-fish fishery (CRFFF) on the Great Barrier Reef has been managed under ITQs since 
2004. A large number of different reef species (>155) are covered by the management plan, but the primary species 
in terms of value and volume landed are coral trout and red throat emperor. All remaining species are classified as 
other species for management purposes. The operational side of the fishery is relatively heterogeneous and distinct 
sub-divisions exist between participants in terms of individual vessel characteristics and the species and product 
forms landed. The ITQ system has introduced an additional dimension for heterogeneity between fishers whilst also 
allowing investors not participating in the fishery to hold and trade quota. This analysis uses data on individual level 
quota holdings and trades to assess the CRFFF quota market and its evolution through time. Fishery level trends in 
ownership and trade are determined, and market participants are identified as belonging to one out of a set of seven 
generalized types. The emergence of groups such as investors and lease dependent fishers is clear. In 2010-11 42% 
of coral trout quota was owned by participants that did not fish it and 69% of total coral trout landings were made by 
fishers that owned only 11% of the quota. The incentives faced by the groups within the fishery differ, as do their 
vulnerabilities and resilience to natural or management related changes in the fishery's situation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Australian coral reef fin-fish fishery (CRFFF) on the Great Barrier Reef has been managed under ITQs since the 
1
st of July 2004. This paper uses information on quota holdings, individual trades and levels of catch to perform a 
network analysis and map out how lease trade based networks have evolved over the last seven years. We also 
consider differences in individual standings with respect to factors such as quota held, traded and caught. The paper 
first provides background information on the whole CRFFF before concentrating on the lease trade network for 
coral trout, the most significant component in terms of quantity landed and GVP. 
The Coral Reef Fin-Fish Fishery 
Queensland’s Coral Reef Fin-Fish Fishery (CRFFF) is a line based fishery that targets primarily demersal reef-
associated fish and operates from the middle to the far north of Australia’s east coast. A significant proportion of 
this  area,  the  Great  Barrier  Reef  Marine  Park  (GBRMP)  is  managed  by  the  Great  Barrier  Reef  Marine  Park 
Authority (GBRMPA). The fishery is highly diverse in nature and consists of the commercial reef quota (RQ) 
fishery, a charter sector, and in some parts of its range a substantial recreational component. It is multi-species in 
nature and the key commercial species groups include coral trout (CT), red throat emperor (RTE), and other reef 
species (OS) including cods, groupers, sweetlips, tropical snappers, seaperches, and emperors [1]. 
Gross values of commercial landings (estimated at ex-vessel prices) for CT, RTE, and OS were approximately 
AUS$38m ($36m live, $2m dead), $2m, and $3m in 2010-11. The market for landings can be divided into two main 
components, one that is export oriented and one that is domestic. The domestic market consumes mainly dead fish 
(both fresh and frozen) whilst the export market is predominantly for live coral trout that are sent to Hong Kong. 
Live fish accounted for 87% of all CT landings in 2010-11. For the financial year 2010-11 average ex-vessel prices 
of live CT, dead CT, RTE, and OS were AUS$47/kg, $17/kg, $10/kg, and $7/kg, respectively. Prices for dead fish 
are believed to have remained relatively stable over the last 5 to 10 years whereas the price of live CT displays IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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strong  seasonality  (fluctuating  between  $34/kg  and  70  $/kg  in  the  last  two  years)  due  to  seasonally  driven 
fluctuations in demand in China. 
The commercial sector is managed under the Fisheries Regulation 2008, and the Fisheries (Coral Reef Fin Fish) 
Management Plan 2003. In practice a suite of both input and output oriented controls are applied which include, but 
are not limited to, measures such as limited entry (licenses), size constraints for vessels and gear, minimum and 
maximum  landing  sizes,  and  total  allowable  catches  (TACs).  Other  than  two  5-day  spawning  closures,  one  in 
October and one in November, the fishery operates year round with seasonal variation due to market and weather-
related factors. RQ vessels are also subject to spatial restrictions on where they can operate as part of the GBRMP 
and  Queensland  Marine  Parks  Zoning  Plans  [2].  On  the  adoption  of  commercial  TACs  on  the  1  July  2004 
commercial license holders were allocated individual tradable quotas (ITQs) based primarily on the historical catch 
records associated with the license. 
There are three types of RQ quota; coral trout (CT), red throat emperor (RTE), and other species (OS). As the name 
suggests  OS  incorporates  a  number  of  (approx.  154)  other  reef  fish  species,  however  only  a  relatively  small 
proportion of these are actively targeted by the commercial fishery. CT quota covers seven separate species of coral 
trout  but  the  majority  of  landings  consist  of  the  common  coral  trout  (Plectropomus leopardus).  Under  current 
conditions one quota unit represents one kilogram of fish (live weight equivalent) for all quota types, however there 
is some capacity for this to be adjusted if specified catch triggers are reached [3]. The available TACs for CT, RTE, 
and OS are 1,288,156kg, 615,586kg, and 955,604kg, respectively. As legislated, the commercial RQ TACs should 
not exceed 1350t for CT, 700t for RTE, and 1011t for OS, however following an allocation appeals process the CT 
TAC  was  adjusted  to  ~1423t.  The  Australian  Government  Department  of  Sustainability,  Environment,  Water, 
Population and Communities (SEWPaC) subsequently bought back out 135t of CT, 73t of RTE and 109t of OS, in 
2004-05, consequently reducing the quantity of quota available to commercial fishers. 
RQ effort and landings fell sharply in 2004-05 (Figure 1) following the introduction of TACs and implementation of 
the GBRMPA Representative Areas Program. The latter increased the area of no-take zones in the GBRMP from 
<5% to >33% and was accompanied by a statewide fisheries buyback program. Landings have since remained low 
when compared to the pre-quota era and to-date, the TACs have not been met, so cannot currently be considered to 
actively constrain the RQ fishery’s level of output. The only quota group to have come close is CT in the year 2008-
09 when approximately 96% of the TAC was landed. In more recent years two significant cyclone events, Hamish in 
March 2009 and Yasi in February 2010, have also contributed to a decline in effort and landings across the whole 
fishery. Historic landings and the TAC (horizontal black dashed line) for each RQ group are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. RQ landings over time for CT RTE OS with the TAC shown as a horizontal black line 
The aim of the paper is to determine how trade patterns for quota have developed over time. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Data 
The Queensland Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry (QDAFF) holds data at the individual trade level 
for all quota types, along with the quantity of quota held and fished against separate quota account in each year. The 
analysis presented in this paper is based on an anonymised version of this data. The dataset covers the period since 
ITQs were first introduced on the 1
st of July 2004 up to the end of the 2010-11 financial year (30
th of June in 
Australia). Data relating to the years 2006-07 and 2007-08 were partially incomplete so are not included in the 
analysis presented here. As is common in many fisheries managed under ITQs there is no requirement to report the $ 
value of quota transactions along with the quantity traded, meaning that quota trade prices, and how these have 
evolved over time, are not directly available. 
Account holder typologies 
The relative positions people occupy in the quota market can strongly affect the incentive structures they face in 
terms of individual trading and fishing behavior. Following van Putten and Gardner [4] we used information relating 
to individual lease trading behavior and quantities of CT landed annually to assign each quota account holder to one 
out of 7 groups (Table 1). 
Table 1: Account holder typology definitions 
Typology  CT catch  Lease in  Lease out 
Income supplementer  >0    0  >0 
Independent  >0    0    0 
Investor    0    0  >0 
Lease dependent  >0  >0    0 
Quota redistributor <1t  <1t  >0  >0 
Quota redistributor >1t  >1t  >0  >0 
Inactive    0    0    0 
Quota redistributors were split into those that land over one tonne of fish and those that land less in order to 
distinguish between those that are relatively active fishers and those that are not. 
Network analysis 
Social network analysis [5-7] is the mapping and quantification of relationships between individual entities. Based 
upon  the  principals  of  network  theory  [8,  9],  network  maps  and  statistical  measures  are  used  to  illustrate  and 
mathematically assess a network’s properties and indicate how these may have changed over time. In context of the 
CRFFF,  network  analysis  has  been  used  to  formally  identify  the  existence  and  nature  of  trading  relationships 
between anonymous account holders in the market for RQ quota, specifically short-term lease trades for CT. We 
used the open source platform Cytoscape
1 to visualize and analyze the networks but a number of alternatives, such 
as the SNA package in R, are also available. 
This methodology has been widely applied and used to analyze social networks such as the world wide web and 
citations in research [8]. In a fisheries context the significance of social networks has been established with respect 
to compliance [10], viability during resource scarcity [11], and relationships between fish traders [12]. To the best of 
our knowledge a study of the Tasmanian rock lobster ITQ market [13] is the only previous example of this technique 
being used to assess such markets in the context of fisheries. This provides some useful points of reference, allowing 
comparisons to be made between a number of key indicators. 
The structure of networks, the associated descriptive statistics, and how these all change over time indicate how 
information is likely to pass through networks, the ability of one business entity to interact with another, and the 
relative degree of control each individual may exert over exchanges in the network. Individual entities within a IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
  4 
network are typically referred to as nodes and connections between these nodes are called edges. From a theoretical 
perspective, the structural distribution of these edges, can range from being either purely random to completely 
regular. Early work in the area assumed random connectivity [14] but more recently it has been shown that real life 
networks, especially those in the social / economic domain often display markedly non-random, so called “scale-
free”, properties [15, 16]. 
The number of other nodes any single node is directly connected with is its degree d. A network is said to be scale-
free when its degree distribution, conforms to that of a power distribution [15]. 
P(d)=cd
-γ,                      (Eq. 1) 
where P(d) is the probability P that a node has degree d, c is a normalizing constant, and γ is an unknown parameter. 
For γ < 3 the average degree distribution is considered not representative and the network is deemed to be scale-free 
[16]. Under a power distribution the frequency of very high and very low degree distribution nodes is higher than 
would be expected had the network formed purely at random [17] and indicates the prominence of high degree 
nodes acting as hubs. 
Several  additional  statistical  measures  are  also  used  to  assess  the  networks  and  are  computed  using  the 
NetworkAnalyser component of Cytoscape [18]. The clustering coefficient is a measure of local cohesiveness and 
for directed networks 
Ci = ei / ( di ( di-1 ) ),                    (Eq. 2) 
where di is the number of neighbors of i and ei is the number of connected pairs between all neighbors of i and 0 < Ci 
< 1. The average clustering coefficient gives an overall indication of the level of clustering in the network as a whole 
and it has been shown that real world social networks can display high levels of clustering when compared to purely 
random networks [19]. 
The network diameter indicates the maximum length of shortest paths between two nodes, in terms of the number of 
edges d between them. The characteristic path length of a network is the average shortest path length between nodes 
in the network, the shortest path length being L(i,j), where i and j are two separate nodes. A high characteristic path 
length relative to the number of nodes in the network implies the network is becoming similar to a linear chain 
whereas a relatively low characteristic path length indicates the network is compact. 
Characteristics  of  the  nodes  themselves  are  assessed  using  measures  of  closeness  centrality  and  betweenness 
centrality. The closeness centrality of a node is a measure of how fast information can spread between connected 
nodes in the network [20] and is calculated in Cytoscape as the reciprocal of its average shortest path length. 
Cc(i) = 1 / avg( L(i,j) ),                    (Eq. 3) 
where L(i,j) is the length of the shortest path between two nodes i and j, and 0<Cc<1 and zero indicates the node is 
isolated. The betweenness centrality of a node provides an indication of the amount of control exerted by this 
individual node on interactions in the network, Cytoscape uses the Brandes [21] algorithm to calculate this: 
Cb(i) = ∑ j ≠ I ≠ k (σjk(i) / σjk),                  (Eq. 4) 
where j and k are different nodes to i, σjk is the number of shortest paths from j to k, and σjk(i) the number of 
shortest paths from j to k that i lies on [21]. 
In the context of trade networks, properties such as those described in this section bear direct relation with the ability 
of information to spread between groups, and have implications for overall market efficiency. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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Determinants of position in the market 
Finally, basic linear regression models were estimated in R in order to investigate whether and the extent to which 
the type of connectivity individual account holders have in the market place (as measured by in / out degree or edge 
counts) could be explained as a function of their typological group (Table 1) as well as quantitative measures of their 
involvement in CT fishing and CT quota trading (e.g. lease in/out quantities, quota owned and used). 
RESULTS 
Market dynamics 
The greatest change in number of market participants was seen between 2004-05 and 2005-06 for all quota groups. 
CT, RTE and OS market participant numbers fell by 21%, 19%, and 13% respectively. This is believed to be mainly 
a result of license owners selling the entitlements they were awarded in the initial year, and is supported by the 
exceptionally high volume of permanent trades observed in this period. Permanent trades in the first year were seen 
to be in the region of 30-35% of the TAC whereas all subsequent years fall between 5-10% of TAC. 
A summary of selected market characteristics and how these have evolved over time for the three quota types is set 
out in Table 2. Three years are reported, the year that ITQs were first introduced into the RQ fishery (2004-05), what 
is considered to be the ‘peak’ catch year since the introduction of ITQs (2008-09), and the last year for which 
complete records are available (2010-11). 
Table 2: Summary of quota lease trade markets for each RQ group in the financial years 2004-05, 2008-09, 
and 2010-11 
 
The proportion of account holders participating in the lease market, the overall volume of quota leased, and the 
numbers of temporary trades undertaken were lowest in the first year of ITQs for all quota types. For CT these 
measures of participation and trade peak with landings in 2008-09 before falling to levels more similar to those seen 
in 2005-06. Measures of lease trade and participation for RTE and OS quota do not peak until a year later in 2009-
10, when landings were also highest since the introduction of ITQs for RTE and amongst the highest for OS. These 
quota groups also differ from CT in the way that trades and levels of participation in their markets remain relatively 
flat after peaking, rather than falling. The proportion of account holders that participate in the associated lease trade 
markets are generally lower for OS and RTE categories when compared to CT for all years other then the most 
recent when CT participation fell close to that of OS (56%). Concentration of quota ownership was tested for by 
calculating the Gini index
2 for each quota group in each year; the indices indicate that the market was relatively 
concentrated  for  all  groups  in  2004-05  and  has  become  increasingly  concentrated  over  time.  The  rate  of 
concentration was greatest between the first year of ITQs and 2008-09. 
Over the whole period observed, annual numbers of individual lease transactions increased by 95%, 193%, and 
237% for CT, RTE and OS. The quantity of units leased also increased, by 47%, 82%, and 102% for CT, RTE and 
  Coral Trout  Other Species  Red Throat Emperor 
  2004-05  2008-09  2010-11  2004-05  2008-09  2010-11  2004-05  2008-09  2010-11 
Account holders   367  322  320  359  375  374  358  351  354 
Accounts landing fish  165  168  175  194  223  219  158  158  160 
Number of lease 
trades  284  730  554  96  210  281  112  357  377 
Lease Trades (LT) (000 
units)   511.98  1,241.83  750.21  237.50  615.14  480.24  134.28  220.13  244.42 
LT / TAC (%)  0.40  0.96  0.58  0.25  0.64  0.50  0.22  0.36  0.40 
Permanent Trades 
(PT) (000 units)  373.97  70.08  95.39  312.90  49.55  49.83  199.62  28.38  59.17 
PT / TAC (%)  0.29  0.05  0.07  0.33  0.05  0.05  0.32  0.05  0.10 
% account holders 
with no LT  0.57  0.20  0.44  0.74  0.43  0.45  0.76  0.60  0.54 
Gini Coefficient  0.656  0.787  0.792  0.534  0.711  0.726  0.636  0.768  0.777 IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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OS respectively. These are generally substantially larger increases than the 47% increase in number of trades and 
60% increase in volume of trades seen over a comparable period of time in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery [13]. 
As the total quantity of units leased (kg) increased proportionally less than the number of lease trades, the average 
size of these trades has fallen over time and by 2010-11 average CT lease trades were 25% smaller than in 2004-05, 
RTE 38%, and OS 40%. 
Changes in the distribution of quota account types 
Proportional ownership and use of CT quota by the alternative groups of quota accounts is illustrated in Figure 2. At 
the group level investors have consistently owned the greatest proportion of quota for the whole period observed 
(536,643 units in 2010-11), whilst lease dependent fishers have accounted for the greatest proportion of landings 
(606 tonnes in 2010-11). The role of investors as ‘owners’ and lease dependent fishers as ‘catchers’ has been 
consistently developing over time with investor holdings increasing from 10% of the CT TAC in 2004-05 to 42% in 
2010-11, and proportion of landings CT taken by lease dependent fishers going from 40% in 2004-05 to 69% in 
2010-11. The role of quota redistributors that also land over one tonne of CT per year has diminished, both in terms 
of ownership and use, with the proportion of landings taken by this group falling sharply from 37% to 10%, almost 
exactly the same amount lease dependent landings have increased by. Ownership of quota by redistributors that 
landed less than one tonne of CT increased and then decreased as landings did the same. 
Of the 367 businesses present in the first year of ITQs 176 of these were seen to still be present in some form by 
2010-11. A significant proportion (38%) of businesses was inactive in 2004-05, meaning that quota owners neither 
leased nor caught any part of their quota during that year. This proportion was still 24% of the total in 2010-11, but 
decreased to 14% in 2008-09. Of the 139 inactive businesses seen in 2004-05, 103 left the system by 2010-11 (these 
businesses could be assumed to have sold out), 20 were still inactive, 3 had become independent (indicating that 
they had started fishing on their quota), 8 had become investors (so were now leasing their quota out), and 2 had 
become quota redistributors<1t (so were now leasing quota in and out, and catching CT). The 46 accounts classified 
as inactive in 2008-09 held a total of 33,787 CT quota units (~3% of TAC) (range of 0 to 12,292) 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of CT quota ownership and use for alternative typologies as a proportion of the total 
(SEWPaC holdings excluded) 
The number of independent operators fell as CT fishery conditions were such that the TAC was nearly taken in 
2008-09, but once again increased as the gap between total fishery catches and the TAC increased. The quantity of 
account holders deemed to be inactive (use = 0, lease in/out = 0) almost doubled over the period observed from 46 in 
2008-09 to 75 in 2010-11, however the volume of quota owned by this group increased six fold from just under 33 
tonnes in 2008-09 to almost 193 tonnes in 20010-11, such that in 2010-11 15% of the TAC for CT was not fished or 
traded. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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Network analysis results 
The plots in Figure 3 depict the CT lease trade market network in each financial year, and how it has changed over 
time. The circular nodes each represent an individual quota account that held or traded CT in that year. The lines 
joining nodes, edges, represent the existence of a direct lease trading relationship between those quota account 
holders in that financial year. The size of connected nodes reflects the total volume of trade it is involved in over the 
year in terms of number of quota units traded (both in and out). The completely unconnected nodes that sit at the 
bottom of each network are the quota holders that do not undertake any lease trade activity in that year, and as such 
their size is not related to level of trade. These businesses are a combination of those classified as either independent 
or inactive in Table 1. 
 
Figure 3. CT lease trade network maps 
The network maps clearly demonstrate how CT lease market connections have evolved; with high numbers of 
unconnected  non-traders  in  the  first  year  (2004-05)  the  network  then  builds  up,  incorporating  more  and  more 
participants, to a peak in 2008-09 before reverting to some extent by 2010-11. In a directed network such as the one 
considered here, where relationships are not necessarily symmetrical (i.e. trader A may lease to trader B but B does 
not lease to A), the degree distribution can be assessed in terms of either its inbound connections (in-degree) or its 
outbound connections (out-degree) as the numbers for each will vary. Degree distributions of both forms are plotted 
on a log scale in Figure 4 for the CT lease trade network and the parameter values for the power law (equation 1) are 
reported in Table 3. 
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Figure 4. Annual level degree distributions (log scale, in- and out-) for the CT lease trade market 
The general shape of the degree distributions in Figure 3 is similar across all years and relationship directions. This 
illustrates that the majority of market participants were connected to relatively few (one or less) other participants 
2004-05  2005-06  2009-2010  2008-09  2010-2011 IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
  8 
for  the  years  observed.  In  2004-05  80%  of  account  holders  had  an  in-degree  of  zero,  implying  no  inbound 
connections,  and  70%  had  out-degree  measures  of  zero.  In  the  same  period  10%  and  22%  of  account  holder 
respectively had in- and out-degree measures of only one (indicating lease trading relationships with only one other 
account holder). Account holders with no lease trading relationships (i.e. degree distribution of zero) always formed 
the largest group in each year. The proportion of account holders with degree distributions of zero (for both in and 
out) were observed to be at their smallest in 08-09 when they accounted for 58% and 45% of account holders 
respectively, implying that nearly half the account holders leased quota in, while more than half the account holders 
leased quota out in that year. 
All of the degree distributions satisfy the power-law (Table 3), indicating that all the networks have scale-free 
properties. The change in the network’s nature can also be clearly seen in these indicators, with the γ coefficient 
being lowest in the high trade year indicating that hub type components play a greater role in that year (also visible 
in figure 3). Results for the initial year may be harder to interpret as the high levels of permanent trading that 
occurred concurrently in this and the following year is likely to have confounded the measure for these periods. 
Table 3: Power law values for CT lease trade degree distributions 
  Coefficient  2004-5  2008-9  2010-11 
In-degree  a  43.572  41.968  70.603 
  γ  -1.747  -1.211  -1.719 
  correlation  0.979  0.994  0.989 
  R
2  0.937  0.853  0.891 
          Out-degree  a  65.989  44.432  42.082 
  γ  -2.224  -1.339  -1.453 
  correlation  0.999  0.972  0.993 
  R
2  0.932  0.762  0.870 
The major differences between degree distributions in Figure 4 are seen in the size of the distribution’s tail each 
year. In its initial years (2004-05 and 2005-06) the network has relatively short tails, with the maximum number of 
trading relationships any one market participant had being 10 in 2004-05 and 14 in 2005-06 (both out-degree). By 
2008-09 (solid triangular points) the maximum had increased to 53 and 40 (for in- and out-degree respectively), the 
highest levels observed in any period, resulting in much fatter tails. In 2009-10 and 2010-11 the maximum number 
of inward oriented trading relationships dropped to 13 and 12 respectively. Outward oriented relationships dropped 
to 25 and 19 respectively. 
The proportion of account holders with a degree greater than or equal to 4 never exceeds 10% of the total number of 
account holders. In the years with unusually high maximum levels of degree distribution, primarily 2008-09, this 
effect is all the  more pronounced (Table 4). By removing the account  holder  with the highest level of degree 
distribution in each year the gap between these individuals with exceptionally high levels of degree distribution and 
the remainder of the network becomes apparent (Table 4). 
Table 4: Minimum and maximum levels of degree distribution within the CT lease trade market 
  2004-05  2005-06  2008-09  2009-10  2010-11  Mean  Sd. 
Max:               
in-degree  10  14  53  13  12  20.4  18.3 
out-degree  8  12  40  25  19  20.8  12.6 
Max after account holder with highest degree distribution removed:     
in-degree  8  13  15  10  8  10.8  3.1 
Out-degree  7  11  15  12  15  12  3.3 
The network clustering coefficient is consistently close to zero, as in the Tasmanian rock lobster (RL) case [13]
3 and 
indicates low levels of clustering at the network level. Measures of network diameter were generally lower in the CT 
market (from 3 to 8) when compared to values observed in Rock Lobster study (4 to 11). The peak of 8 occurs in 
2008-09 and the value subsequently falls to 6 in 2010-11. This indicates a relatively less complex network and more IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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direct routes between the furthest apart agents in the market. These differences with the Tasmanian rock lobster case 
are possibly related to the fact that rules regarding quota ownership and trade differ between the two fisheries, with 
QLD regulations allowing for broker-type activity to develop, as well as concentration of ownership
4. 
Not accounting for the initial year (2004-05), due to the relatively small number of nodes taking part in the market, 
the characteristic path length of the network has steadily fallen over time, from 3.37 in 2005-06 to 2.32 in 2010-11, 
indicating that the average trading connection between any two agents fell in this period. The initial increase from 
1.45  to  3.37  between  2004-05  and  2005-06  is  likely  to  be  a  result  of  the  increase  in  the  number  of  market 
participants over the same period, in the absence of broker type nodes that reduce the average path length between 
nodes. A similar magnitude increase in the characteristic path length was observed in the RL fishery and attributed 
to increasing numbers of quota owners having high number of connections. 
Figure 5 plots the proportion of account holders with centrality values greater than zero over time. The proportion of 
individuals with a closeness centrality greater than zero in the CT market (Figure 5) is initially much higher than that 
observed for RL, but steadily decreases over time, which would indicate a fragmentation of the network into sub-
components. This may be regionally defined, in relation to spatial constraints. The betweenness centrality for CT 
slightly increased in 2008-09 but then fell back close to its initial level, a level comparable to that observed in early 
years of RL quota trading. 
 
Figure 5. Proportion of nodes with betweenness and closeness centrality >0 for the CT lease market 
Position of account groups in the network 
Values for quantities of CT quota leased in and leased out were found to be highly correlated hence only the 
information for leasing out is used in the models reported here (Table 5). The three models presented all relate to 
2010-11 and show that whilst the quantitative measures detailing how much CT quota an individual owns, catches, 
or leases out are in all cases significant, the magnitude of their influence is very small. The typological groups 
however are also highly significant where we would expect them to be and have greater influence on the magnitude 
of account holders in- / out- degree or edge count. As expected, parameter values for the independent group are not 
significantly different to zero in all models as the measures of degree for these individuals are always zero. Lease 
dependent status is significant with respect to the probability of having a high in-degree, whilst not significant with 
respect  to  out-degree,  again  conforming  to  expectations  as  this  group  will  have  predominantly  incoming 
relationships within the network. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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Table 5: LR models for CT quota lease market participants in 2010-11 
  Dependent variable 
  In-degree  Out-degree  EdgeCount 
Explanatory variables  Estimate  Std.  Sig  Estimate  Std.  Sig  Estimate  Std.  Sig 
Constant  0.207  0.110  .  0.094  0.148    0.301  0.219   
CT quota owned  0.000  0.000  ***  0.000  0.000  **  0.000  0.000  *** 
CT catch  0.000  0.000  ***  0.000  0.000  **  0.000  0.000  *** 
LeaseOut  0.000  0.000  ***  0.000  0.000  ***  0.000  0.000  *** 
Investor  -0.255  0.169    0.999  0.227  ***  0.744  0.337  * 
Independent  -0.153  0.171    -0.056  0.230    -0.209  0.341   
IncomeSupp  -0.366  0.312    0.961  0.418  *  0.595  0.621   
LeaseDependent  1.310  0.164  ***  -0.308  0.220    1.002  0.327  ** 
QuotaRedistL1t  1.651  0.278  ***  2.134  0.373  ***  3.785  0.553  *** 
QuotaRedistG1t  1.721  0.279  ***  1.425  0.375  ***  3.146  0.556  *** 
Adjusted R2    0.621        0.600        0.590   
(Significance codes: . 0.05, *0.01, **0.001, ***0) 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
From inception up to the 2008-09 peak in CT catch, network indicators for the CT ITQ component of the CRFFF 
fishery are generally consistent with those observed in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery [13], and with those of a 
growing  and  maturing  marketplace.  As  the  fishery  came  closer  to  reaching  its  TAC  temporary  trade  activity 
increased substantially and the role of well connected “hub” nodes grew. Yet, despite the networks all displaying 
scale-free properties, the typically assumed trend towards increasing scalefreeness as networks evolve [8] is not 
consistently observed in this case, with the opposite actually being observed to some degree as the gap between total 
landings and TAC subsequently grew between 2008-09 and 2010-11. 
The observation that after the peak of 2008-09 the γ coefficient for in-degree distribution was seen to increase again, 
back to 2004-05 levels, also suggests a strong reduction in the role of well connected nodes as leasers in of quota 
from multiple other traders. Whilst the CT lease trade network has reverted to some degree since 2008-09, this has 
not occurred in a symmetrical manner as certain features of the peak period remain. However, and interestingly, the 
out-degree γ coefficient remained close to the level observed in 2008-09, suggesting that their role as a supplier of 
quota (with many outward connections) to the network has persisted. One possible explanation for this is that over 
time such account holders have undertaken permanent transfers to acquire sufficient quota that their need to lease 
quota  in  just  to  satisfy  demand  has  diminished,  especially  as  demand  for  CT  quota  is  far  lower  in  2010-11. 
Concentration in the ownership of quota was observed for CT, lending weight to this explanation. This points to a 
need for permanent and temporary trades to be considered jointly in the analysis.  
The other striking result is the proportion of nodes that are disconnected. The disconnected nodes seen in Figure 3 
are a combination of businesses deemed either inactive or independent in Figure 5 and the pattern of disconnected 
nodes  becoming  less  prevalent  in  better  years  is  linked  with  the  general  increase  in  the  level  of  lease  market 
participation seen at that time (Table 1). For the independent component, when catches were higher, businesses 
whose quota holdings had previously been sufficient to cover their catches, and allow them to exist outside of the 
lease  market,  needed  to  source  additional  quota  and  consequently  entered  the  market  in  order  to  lease  it  in 
(becoming ‘lease dependent’ in the process). This situation was also reflected in the inactive component whose 
numbers were substantially lower in the peak period (falling from 139 in 2004-05 to 13 in 2008-09) as they either 
sold out (99), began leasing their quota out (19 became investors), fished it themselves (4 became independent), 
fished it and leased it out (2 became income supplementers), fished it and leased in (1 became lease dependent), or 
leased in and leased out (1 became a quota redistributor<1t. These numbers were similar by 2010-11, the main 
exception being those that were investors falling by half with most of these having sold out. 
The observation that some degree of inactivity persisted throughout the whole period (quota holders that did nothing 
with their quota) is an interesting and somewhat counterintuitive situation. In addition to the opportunity cost of not IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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using it in some way (fish, lease out), the ownership of quota incurs annual fees that are levied independent of 
whether it is fished. Inactivity also results in the loss of associated catch history, potentially another cost to the 
account  holder  should  management  conditions  change.  Without  more  information  logical  explanations  for  this 
situation  are  that  imperfect  exchange  of  information  is  forming  barriers  to  trade  or  that  the  transaction  costs 
associated with leasing out are simply too great and exceed the benefits. At the fishery level this withheld quota has 
potential  implications  with  respect  to  the  lease  price  in  times  of  high  demand  and  is  effectively  a  source  of 
inefficiency. 
As broker nodes are not stable it is likely that the flow of information through the network will be asymmetrical, 
leading to inefficiency. Further, if individual entities each only hold low quantities of quota it is quite possible that 
the transaction costs involved with leasing it out, especially in periods of thin demand, prevent this from happening. 
However, in 2010-11 inactive nodes held an average of just over 2.5t of quota. 
If the most likely point of entry to the network for a disconnected node is via a broker node [15] this will also result 
in connected nodes becoming increasingly connected in periods with increased lease market participation. It was 
anticipated that being highly connected may also provide an advantage to these account holders in times of low 
demand and facilitate the leasing out of their quota ahead of less connected account holders, however the data does 
not support this. 
The results demonstrate that as catches increased to the point that the TAC for CT was close to being taken, there 
was a clear emergence of very highly connected broker type entities. These then fell away again to some extent in 
years where quota uptake was lower. It appears evident that under conditions of high demand (and thinning supply) 
instead  of  many  individuals  forming  lease  trade  relationships  with  many  other  individuals,  a  likely  inefficient 
situation if the result is high numbers of small trades with multiple quota owners (and relatively high transaction 
costs), these account holders instead form relationships with the same singular or few individuals (broker nodes) 
depicted in figure 3. 
When demand for quota fell as a result of lower landings at the fishery level the necessity for individuals to source 
quota in excess of their norm – resulting in interactions and trade with account holders outside of their usual range – 
the role of broker nodes, especially as leasers in, abated. This is likely to be because at lower levels of demand 
fishers are able to satisfy their trade requirements via existing (possibly more local) networks at the port level, or 
within  their  social  network.  Only  once  demand  increases  to  the  point  that  these  familiar  connections  are  not 
sufficient, will brokers who are able to facilitate trades of the size and nature wanted become more attractive due to 
the likely lower transaction costs associated with dealing with one as opposed to many smaller holders. The extent to 
which hubs play an important role as brokers seems to vary with the circumstances of the fishery. In a slack market, 
people may know enough about potential supply and demand of quota immediately around them to satisfy their 
needs.  In  a  tighter  market,  this  may  not  be  enough,  and  recourse  to  brokerage  type  services  might  develop, 
increasing the importance of certain key nodes. 
The  regression  analysis  suggests  there  is  some  connection  between  an  account  holders  characteristics  (both 
typological and quantitative) and the role they end up playing in a trade network in terms of their connectivity (in-
degree, out-degree). The typology was seen to be the strongest indicators of the number and type of connections an 
account holder will have and further validate the explanatory robustness of the typologies themselves. This paper 
presents only an initial overview of the CT lease trade network and further work is needed to better investigate 
aspects such as the other quota groups, concurrent permanent trades, the influence and importance of sub-networks, 
and how initial allocations and position in the market influence long term survival and market efficiency. 
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1 www.cytoscape.org/ 
2 The Gini index measures the level of inequality among values, the index is can have a value of between zero and 
one where zero is perfect equality and one perfect inequality (i.e. where one person owns all quota). 
3 This is to be expected in a market where agents trade to maximize profit, there is heterogeneity in preferences / 
utilities derived from owning / leasing quota and lack of concentration of ownership of quota in only a few agents. 
4 The Tasmanian rock lobster fishery has restrictions on the ownership of quota. 